Q1. What are the key features of the FTPA proposed by Projek SAMA?
The Fixed Term Parliament Act proposed by Projek SAMA is one simple but powerful idea：
The Parliament shall serve its full term of five (5) years unless one of these two exceptions applies:
(a) The Prime Minister loses the confidence of Dewan Rakyat; OR,
(b) Two-thirds or more members of Dewan Rakyat pass a resolution to call for an early dissolution.
The “exceptions” are designed to be the product of ordinary parliamentary activity. The exceptions do not bypass or dilute any part of the Federal Constitution, including Articles 40 and 43 which inform government formation and dismissal.
Q2. In the proposed FTPA, what would constitute loss of confidence in the government?
The government is deemed to have lost the confidence of the Dewan Rakyat only if any of these happens:-
(a) A motion of no-confidence in the Prime Minister is passed in the Dewan Rakyat; OR
(b) A motion of confidence in the Prime Minister is defeated in the Dewan Rakyat; OR
(c) A budget (Supply Bill) is defeated in the second or third reading. This explicitly excludes counting of Statutory Declarations (SDs) as a method to determine loss of confidence. Any motion of confidence or no-confidence must be prioritised in the Dewan Rakyat, and as a package, the procedures for the passing of motions of confidence or no-confidence must be clearly set out in the Standing Orders of the Dewan Rakyat.
Q3. What positive effects can the proposed FTPA bring to Malaysia?
First, dismissal of the government can only be done in a transparent manner on the floor of Dewan Rakyat. It cannot be done by any process shrouded in secrecy, such as the counting of SDs.
Second, the power to seek royal consent for early dissolution of Parliament will be shared amongst parliamentarians. This power will no longer be monopolized by the Prime Minister.
Third, unless either of the exceptions takes place, the date of Parliament’s dissolution will be known five years in advance. This assured lifespan will enhance predictability and stability of governments and policies.
Q4. Will the proposed FTPA compromise the monarch’s power under Article 40(2)(b) and Article 43(4) of the Federal Constitution?
Absolutely not. The proposed FTPA does not affect Article 40(2)(b) of the Federal Constitution. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong (YDPA) can act in his discretion to withhold consent to a request for the dissolution of Parliament.
The FTPA only constrains the discretionary power of the Prime Minister in seeking royal consent for early dissolution. If he/she still enjoys the confidence of the Dewan Rakyat, he/she will have to share that power with fellow parliamentarians who constitute a twothirds majority.
The misperception that the YDPA will lose his discretionary power under an FTPA arises from the wrong assumption that Malaysia’s FTPA must be a carbon-copy of the British FTPA (2011-22) which was formulated in a vastly different constitutional context. The UK has no written constitution and since 1834, its monarchs have stayed above politics.
Q5. Will the proposed FTPA deny parliamentarians freedom of choice?
Absolutely not. The proposed FTPA will result in prioritisation of confidence votes in the Standing Orders of the Dewan Rakyat. This prioritisation will enhance parliamentarians’ collective right to oust a government. Signing SDs is not freedom of choice. Signing SDs is a rejection of voter’s expectations embodied in the Federal Constitution that parliamentarians must vote on the floor of Dewan Rakyat.
Q6. Will the proposed FTPA artificially sustain a weak or unpopular government?
Absolutely not. As the proposed FTPA would cause prioritisation of confidence votes in the Standing Orders of the Dewan Rakyat, weak and unpopular governments can be ousted more easily. The proposed FTPA only eliminates the use and abuse of SDs, thereby protecting governments from the distraction of non-stop political speculations and harassment.
Q7. Isn’t the proposed FTPA anti-democratic when it does not allow early dissolutions of Parliament when necessary?
This is a common misperception of FTPA. It arises in the minds of those who read the word “Fixed Term” without studying the details. Both the British FTPA and the one proposed for Malaysia by Projek SAMA allow early dissolutions of Parliament. Both merely restrict the permissible circumstances to a loss of majority, or to the support of early dissolution by a two-thirds majority.
The latter means that the Prime Minister no longer monopolises the power to seek royal consent for early dissolution but instead has to share it with fellow parliamentarians who make up a two-thirds majority. Why should we equate democracy to the dominance of a Prime Minister? If anything, it is more democratic than giving the discretion to one person.
Currently, early dissolution requires the YDPA’s consent as a safeguard against a Prime Minister’s impulsive request. The proposed FTPA merely adds an extra safeguard (two thirds of Dewan Rakyat) without affecting the original safeguard (royal consent). Neither is undemocratic.
Q8. Did FTPA work for the UK? If it did not, how can it work for Malaysia?
The UK FTPA was introduced in 2011 to keep the Conservatives-Liberal Democrats coalition government in place for its full term. The conservative Prime Minister could not unilaterally call for an early election if the Liberal Democrats disagreed.
The FTPA worked as intended for two general elections, in 2015 and 2017. In the Brexit crisis, it prevented the Conservative Governments under Prime Ministers Theresa May and Boris Johnson from calling a snap election to end the deadlock, until Johnson circumvented it with a new law.
In short, the UK’s FTPA was seen as a problem when the opponents to Brexit wanted the Government to serve a full term and Parliament to have more time to deliberate and decide on the divisive issue.
In contrast, Malaysia needs an FTPA to stop the Opposition from destablising politics by threatening to shorten the Government’s term when they do not even have the number.
Hence, even if one agrees that FTPA had failed in the UK, it will still work in stabilising Malaysian politics. As Malaysia lacks established constitutional conventions that can restrain political actors, the proposed FTPA will provide Malaysia a much-needed mechanism in determining the Dewan Rakyat’s confidence in Government, vital to the health of parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy.
Q9. If the FTPA in the UK could not prevent its circumvention, how can it avoid the same fate in Malaysia?
While the UK’s FTPA imposed a threshold of two-thirds majority to pass a motion calling for an early general election, amending and repealing FTPA only requires a simple majority.1 Thus, it enabled Prime Minister Boris Johnson to circumvent it by passing another law in November 2019 to fix the date for an early election. Without a higher passing threshold, the changes introduced to an FTPA may “be driven by short-term
political incentives rather than robust principles or long-term vision.”2
